



# **Local Governance: A Short Review of Changes in Various Jurisdictions**

**Future of Local Governance  
Research Paper**

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## INTRODUCTION

The following research paper is part of the AUMA's Task Force on the Future of Local Governance. The Task Force is responsible for developing a Policy Options Report on the future of local governance in Alberta. Furthermore, the work of the Task Force is a priority initiative for AUMA, as strong local governance is a key element of sustainability, strong local governance is critical to municipal sustainability objectives. This paper provides a review of current and recent efforts in making changes to local governance. Local governments examined are from various regions of the world including the United States (Indiana), Denmark, and Australia. Current and recent efforts within Canada (Alberta, British Columbia, Ontario, and Saskatchewan) are also examined.

## CANADA

The following paragraphs list examples of efforts to change local governance within several western Canadian provinces over the past fifteen years. According to Lesage and Garcea (2005), there have been three common objectives of Canadian local governance reform: improving governance capacity, improving intergovernmental relations, and improving municipal community relations (Lesage and Garcea 2005). In general, economic efficiency and municipal viability have been issues that have promoted past reform of local governance (Lesage and McMillan 2008).

## Alberta

### Political status of local governance

Similar to the rest of Canada, Alberta has experienced changes to local governance in recent years. Alberta has led some of the changes with their 'new' *Municipal Government Act* (1994) and financial cutbacks to the municipal sector in the 1990s (Lesage and McMillan 2008). However, like the rest of Canada, Alberta is now facing a slowing economy, an increasingly urban society, fiscal distress and cost shifting, increasing pressure to better manage the environment (e.g. water conservation, land use, climate change), and a new face for governance/leadership (AUMA 2009, Ermini and Fiorillo 2008). In general, statements regarding the sustainability of municipalities has caused uncertainty throughout Alberta.

### Goals of the changes

Two objectives of the 1994 changes to local governance in Alberta were to increase the jurisdictional autonomy and operating freedom of municipalities and to enhance good governance. According to Lesage (2005), Alberta's 'new' *Municipal Government Act* (1994) "introduced truly novel features" that freed municipalities from close provincial oversight and provided greater administrative flexibility. The goals of the new MGA include (1) provision of good governance (2) provision of services, facilities or other things that, in the opinion of council, are necessary or desirable for all or a part of the municipality, and (3) developing and maintain safe and viable communities. The legislation indicated up front that municipalities possess broad jurisdiction and powers over local affairs (Lesage 2005).

The legislative reform also introduced the legislative concept of "spheres of jurisdiction". This allowed municipalities to take on powers that match with the requirements of their communities. It provided a solution for different sizes or complexities of municipalities, and moved away from the "one size fits all" concept of

earlier municipal legislation. The 1994 legislation bodes well for the future. The enshrinement of “spheres of jurisdiction” into Alberta’s legislation in 1994, means that the local governance legislative framework in Alberta is flexible, and does not confine Alberta municipalities into the “one size fits all” system of governance.

Other financial reforms were designed to move local governance towards greater jurisdictional autonomy for municipalities (most particularly in relation to incurring debt) and financial flexibility. However, very little was provided by way of new revenue sources and at present many municipalities express deep criticism of the province’s closed purse (Lesage 2005).

### Structure of the changes

In the mid 1990s, Alberta Municipal Affairs committed itself to a program that encouraged municipalities to evaluate their viability as independent corporate entities. As a result, there were a small number of dissolutions and amalgamations between 2000 and 2002 (Lesage 2005).

Other structural changes include Specialized Municipalities as a new classification of municipal government through the new MGA. The new MGA allows the creation of a Specialized Municipality when no other classification of municipal government can meet the needs of residents of the proposed municipality. Alberta also eliminated improvement districts, almost all regional planning commissions, and revamped the system of regional services commissions (Lesage and Garcea 2005). Regional Service Commissions (RSCs) were permitted through the establishment of regulation under the Municipal Government Act for purposes of producing inter municipal services. Prior to 1994, the RSCs were restricted to hard utilities such as water, sewer, and waste management. However, after the new MGA, RSCs were expanded under legislation to cover a broad range of joint municipal services (Lesage and McMillan 2008).

Under Premier Ralph Klein, the provincial government removed education from the county jurisdiction, overhauled land use planning, made changes to the property assessment administration, and created the Municipal Government Board (Lesage 2005).

Another major functional change was the transfer of responsibility for education from the education committees of county councils to reorganized school districts (Lesage and Garcea 2005). The provincial government also reformed the health authorities by passing the *Regional Health Authorities Act* (1994). The Regional Health Authorities Act abolished approximately 200 local hospital and public health boards and replaced them with 17 regional health authorities (RHAs) (Church and Smith 2008). The goal of the reform was to address the efficiency of the health care system through larger integrated management and governance structures (Church and Smith 2008).

### Results of changes

Municipal officials cite “councils” increased confidence to legislate and regulate without frequent need to consult with Alberta Municipal Affairs” as one of the most significant feature of Alberta’s changes to local governance (Lesage and Garcea 2005).

Since 1990, 55 dissolution studies have been initiated. Of these, 37 were requested by municipal councils and 18 were as a result of a petition from the residents. As of March 11, 2009, 51 studies have been completed with 23 resulting in dissolution (Alberta Municipal Affairs, personal communications). Two specialized municipalities were formed since 1994, and these municipalities are unique in Alberta with their blend of urban and rural forms of development. In the past 15 years there have also been numerous debates between municipalities and the Government of Alberta regarding urban form, inter-municipal cost-sharing and revenue-sharing, fair property assessments, and dissolution of larger and likely viable urban municipalities (e.g.: the Town of Peace River and the Town of Didsbury).

## **British Columbia**

### **Political status of local governance**

Municipal reform has ranked high with all three British Columbia governmental regimes since 1991. However, despite an active period of local governance reform, little has changed in terms of structure or functionality (Smith and Stewart 2005).

### **Goals of the changes**

One of the first promises of Premier Gordon Campbell was a major reform of BC's municipal government legislation (Smith and Stewart 2005). This is largely due to accountability issues facing local governance in British Columbia. However, of approximately 140 Acts affecting local governments passed since 1992, few have impacted the structure or function of local government in BC. BC local governments are content to make financial and jurisdictional alterations rather than engage in more fundamental structural or functional changes (Smith and Stewart 2005).

### **Structure of the changes**

In 1965, legislation was passed to create 30 regional districts. By 1969, all of BC with the exception of Stikine was included in 28 regional districts. Currently, there are 27 regional districts. Local governments were able to decide if they wanted to incorporate and initially no functions were required (Bish 2001). After more than 30 years of existence, BC's small local governments continue to offer low costs to their residents while turning an increasing number of activities over to the regional districts. According to the Union of British Columbia Municipalities (UBCM 2005), regional districts serve as the local government for their unincorporated electoral areas, they provide the political and administrative framework necessary to collaborate in the provision of sub-regional services, and are regional service providers for their entire region.

Since 1996, all significant changes to local governance have affected the financial and jurisdictional capacities of municipalities (Smith and Stewart 2005). These reforms include provincial efforts to reduce oversight by the provincial government and provincial promises to allow more taxation powers and to give municipalities natural person powers (Smith and Stewart 2005). In terms of jurisdictional changes, amendments to the BC Municipal Act "set the stage for improvements in both efficiency and accountability...and began a process of empowering local governments" (Smith and Stewart 2005).

The only recent structural change within BC was the creation of the Greater Vancouver Transit Authority (GVTA)/Translink with the passing of the *Greater Vancouver Transportation Authority Act* (1998). The legislation moved responsibility

for transit in the Lower Mainland from a provincially appointed body to one that is indirectly elected/appointed regionally. The Greater Vancouver Transportation Authority Act moved responsibility for Greater Vancouver transportation into the hands of locally elected officials. The GVTA also represents the only functional change over the last 15 years (Smith and Stewart 2005).

According to the UBCM (2009), the past ten years of provincial legislative review and changes to local governments has culminated in the passage of the Community Charter. The Charter restructured the powers that municipalities have at their disposal and has helped them govern in a more flexible and responsive way (Queens Printer 2009).

### Results of the changes

Local governments in BC closely resemble those of the early 1990s. Of the 140 acts of municipal relevance passed since the 1990s, few have impacted structure or function of local governments (Smith and Stewart 2005). Furthermore, according to Smith and Stewart (2005), BC's largest municipalities and regions still have issues with accountability. Over the years, many BC governments have tried to increase local government efficiency through decentralization, but with no effort to improve accountability. In 2005, the primary topic of discussion for the provincial government was adding accountability to local government reform (Smith and Stewart 2005). The AUMA is currently examining whether this is still the case. The UBCM is currently reviewing how regional districts operate, but is not studying reform to the structure of local governance (UMBC 2009).

Bish (2001) argues that BC's regional district system appears to be to an appropriate model for Alberta as Intermunicipal agreements currently exist within Alberta that could be combined in a forum to encourage additional cooperation. Furthermore, BC's regional districts demonstrate that a system based on fiscal equivalence and small municipalities is capable of retaining good democratic representation while taking advantage of specialization and trade in local services (Bish 2001).

## Ontario

### Political status of local governance

In the 1950s, numerous municipalities in Ontario's most populated areas were restructured, the first major structural change being the creation of the Municipality of Metropolitan Toronto in 1958 (Downey and Williams 1998, Siegel 2006). Between 1969 and 1974, ten regional governments were created in the Golden Horseshoe extending from Niagara to Oshawa, and in Sudbury and Ottawa Carleton (Siegel 2005). In the late 1980s, studies were performed on governance and service delivery in these regional municipalities (Downey and Williams 1998).

Ontario's Ministry of Municipal Affairs and Housing (2008) describes the 'restructuring activities' and 'municipal mergers' at the turn of the century as a combination of a number of factors. These factors include urban growth pressures, changes to municipal responsibilities, and the provincial government's goals.

### Goals of the changes

In 1995, Conservative Premier Mike Harris rolled out the *Common Sense Revolution* which highlighted the Conservative Government's policy goals. These goals include reducing government expenditure, debt and deficit, and ultimately reducing taxes

and streamlining bureaucracy. Other goals include decreasing the number of elected local officials while maintaining accessibility to local elected officials and preserving community identity (Kushner and Siegel 2003b). The idea was that economies of scale could be realized by replacing small local governments with larger units, thereby reducing expenditures.

### Structure of the changes

The first product of the *Common Sense Revolution* was the amendment of funding arrangements between the provincial government and school boards (Siegel 2005). This amendment significantly reduced school boards access to local property taxes and shifted funding sources to provincial transfers. As a result, school boards became almost completely dependent on provincial funding (Siegel 2005). By increasing transfers to school boards the province had to reduce transfers to municipalities. As compensation, municipalities received the property tax left vacant by the school boards (Siegel 2003, Siegel 2005). Ultimately, the province wanted to establish greater control over the school system and ensure better equity of funding for education across the entire province.

The province then proceeded with municipal amalgamations, through a strategy that combined persuasion with coercion and urgency, or by using provincial legislation (Siegel 2005, Siegel 2006)<sup>1</sup>. Bill 26, known as the *Savings and Restructuring Act*, is the legislation element, which had both 'permissive' and 'mandatory' elements. The permissive element allowed any group of municipalities to develop their own voluntary restructuring proposal. The mandatory element of the legislation permitted any municipality to ask the Minister of Municipal Affairs and Housing to appoint a commissioner that "had binding authority to order and type of structural change" (Siegel 2006). The use of a commissioner sent a strong message to communities as the commissioner could order a complete amalgamation (Siegel 2006). This happened when a commissioner "ordered a complete amalgamation of the 23 municipalities in the Kent County-City of Chatham area in spite of the fact that none of the local actors wanted such an extensive change" (Siegel 2006). The 'mandatory route' could be invoked by any municipality that was dissatisfied with the program of amalgamation discussions by the voluntary route.

A new *Municipal Act* (2003) was modelled after Alberta's new *Municipal Government Act* (1994), was part of the governance reform. The purpose of the new *Municipal Act* was to provide municipalities with greater autonomy through a broader permissive framework. The Act also gave municipalities natural person powers (Siegel 2006).

### Results of the changes

Siegel (2006) describes structural reform in Ontario as "the amalgamation of municipalities and the restructuring of two-tier counties and regional governments into single-tier governments." Between 1996 and 2008, amalgamations have reduced the number of municipalities from 815 to 444 (Ontario's Ministry of

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<sup>1</sup> The first amalgamation was seen on January 1, 1998, when the Municipality of Metropolitan Toronto was combined with six municipalities to form the single tier City of Toronto. At around the same time, the province created the special purpose body known as the Greater Toronto Services Board (GTSB). This special purpose body, which combined the City of Toronto and the outer suburbs, was designed to coordinate social, transportation, and infrastructure policy for the entire greater Toronto area (Siegel 2005).

Municipal Affairs and Housing 2008). As a result, the number of elected officials has been reduced from 158 to 42 (Kushner and Siegel 2003). Although the amalgamation provisions in Bill 26 did not apply to regional governments, the province identified four regions for immediate review in 1998. The review resulted in the creation of five single tier municipalities: the Cities of Ottawa, Greater Sudbury, and Hamilton; and the Towns of Haldimand and Norfolk (AMO 2008). This restructuring took effect January 1, 2008, and was the last of the high profile amalgamations (Siegel 2005). Furthermore, consolidation of municipal service management has resulted in the creation of 47 Consolidated Municipal Service Managers (CMSMs). In Northern Ontario, they are called District Social Services Administration Boards (AMO 2008).

In terms of financial reform, there were numerous changes in the provincial-municipal relationship in terms of cost sharing. Functional changes have also given municipalities a larger scope for service provision. Major service responsibilities have been shifted between provincial and municipal governments. Municipalities are now more reliant on revenue from their own sources, such as the property tax and user charges, and are considerably less reliant on provincial transfer payments (Siegel 2006). Many municipalities view the financial reforms as typical provincial downloading without increases in revenues. However, the province claims that the provincial-municipal realignment of functions was revenue neutral (Siegel 2005).

Several news items show that there is increasing frustration from residents within the amalgamated municipalities (CBC 2009).

## **Saskatchewan**

### **Political status of local governance**

Joseph Garcea (2005), author of "Saskatchewan's Municipal Reform Agenda" and professor of political science at the University of Saskatoon, describes Saskatchewan's municipalities as having faced problems of depopulation and financial constraints due to both declining revenues and increasing operating costs over the past 15 years (Garcea 2005). In addition, Garcea (2005) explains that both provincial and municipal officials were concerned that municipalities would become increasingly dependent on the province for financial resources and administrative and operational support (Garcea 2005). Saskatchewan has experienced 15 years of attempted municipal reform. For instance, there have been a number of provincially appointed teams and political scientists that have recommended extensive amalgamation and voluntary amalgamation (Saskatchewan, 2000, Garcea 1995). However, each attempt has yielded little results. This impasse is largely due to the inability of provincial and municipal government to agree on how to achieve the goals (Garcea 2005). Of note, unlike other provinces where there have been reductions in the number of municipalities, Saskatchewan has seen no reductions (University of Regina and Canadian Plains Research Centre 2007).

### **Goals of the changes**

Over the past 15 years, there have been four common goals of municipal changes. These goals are municipal capacity building, intermunicipal cooperation, provincial-municipal coordination and cooperation, and good governance.

### Results of the changes

As mentioned earlier, the reforms over the past 15 years have been limited, particularly in terms of structural and functional reform (Garcea 2005). One of the notable financial changes was the modernization of the property assessment system, which focused on modernizing and updating the property tax system and on minimizing what were viewed as inequities among properties (Garcea 2005)<sup>2</sup>. One of the notable jurisdictional changes was the enactment of the *Cities Act* and amendments to some of the other municipal statutes. This reform was designed to empower municipal government in regulating local affairs and in managing internal affairs within municipal institutions (Garcea 2005). According to the University of Regina and Canadian Plains Research Centre (2007), the *Cities Act* is a “novel statute that provides cities with a greater degree of authority and autonomy to govern their respective municipalities, based on the principles of natural person powers and areas of jurisdiction”.

Despite these attempts at reform, the changes did not have a transformative effect. There was little change to local governance capacity, intermunicipal cooperation, or provincial-municipal cooperation. There was little advancement to good municipal governance either (Garcea 2005).

So what is the reason for this impasse? Garcea (2005) believes that the provincial government was the primary obstacle, preventing substantial reform as they were either unwilling or unable to agree on any reforms that were appealing to associations of municipalities and municipal officials. Reasons for this unwillingness to agree to reforms can be traced back to the provinces’ fear of losing control of municipalities, losing some of its governance powers, and losing provincial elections.

## UNITED STATES

Municipalities in the United States are commonly responsible for the provision of urban services, including land use planning and zoning, solid waste collection, waste water and storm water drainage, public works, and public safety. Services supplied by municipalities are determined by the states, as part of the state constitution and legislation. The majority of municipal services involve the cooperation of multitude of local (municipalities, counties, special districts, and regional agencies), state, and federal governments (Vogel 2007).

### Indiana

#### Political status of local governance

In late 2007, the Governor of Indiana initiated the Indiana Commission of Local Government Reform to review local governance. The Governor asked the Commission to develop recommendations to reform and restructure local governance in order to increase the efficiency and effectiveness of its operations and reduce its costs to Indianan taxpayers (Indiana Commission on Local Government Reform 2008). In 2007, there were 3,086 independent local governments in Indiana. In terms of total area, Indiana is approximately 1/11 the size of Alberta.

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<sup>2</sup> Caused by either outdated assessments or by property tax exemptions for too many different types of properties

### Goals of the changes

In 2007, the Indiana Commission on Local Government Reform made 27 recommendations. The recommendations aim to make local government more efficient, effective, understandable and accountable. The themes from the 27 recommendations are as follows:

*Counties:* A clearer, more accountable structure with fewer elected officials is created with better coordination of public safety services.

*Townships:* All present responsibilities are transferred to the county executive.  
*Schools:* Districts that are large enough to provide high quality education at a lower cost and enhance fiscal accountability are established.

*Cities and towns:* Accountability of elected officials is strengthened and the costs of separate elections are eliminated.

*Libraries and Special districts:* Library districts are reformed to provide high quality services at a lower cost and fiscal accountability is improved (Indiana Commission on Local Government Reform, 2007b).

### Structure of the changes

The recommendations would reduce the number of local governments units from 3,086 to 1,931 (37 percent reduction), and the number of elected officials from 11,012 to as few as 5,171 (Indiana Commission on Local Government Reform, 2007b).

### Reasons for local government changes

The Indiana Commission of Local Government Reform (2007) acknowledged that "the current structure of county government is antiquated, having been designed for the realities of the state more than a century and a half ago. Today's challenges warrant a clear, modern and streamlined executive, legislated and administrative structure." The co-chairs of the Commission also noted that Indiana's current system of local government is "a complex and redundant system that results in inconsistent and inefficient service" (Indiana Commission of Local Government Reform 2008). For example, citizens in some areas receive services without paying while citizens in other areas pay for services they do not receive (Indiana Commission of Local Government Reform 2008).

### Results of the changes

On December 19, 2008, the Governor of Indiana recommended 16 of the 27 recommendations, with four of recommendations to be amended. Three of the recommendations have already been initiated and three can be achieved through administrative action with no changes to legislation.

## WORLD

### Australia

#### Political status of local government

Compared to New Zealand, Japan, UK and United States, local government in Australia is unique among other political systems in the world as it provides a narrower range of services (McBride and Moege 2005). Functions of Australian Local



Government include roads, waste management, planning, recreation, welfare, regionalism, retail, and rate collection (LGSA 2006). Furthermore, local government's capacity has remained constrained to a minimalist (property servicing) role (LGSA 2006). Compared with other countries, Australian local government receives only five percent of the nation's general government resources.

The Australia constitution does not recognize local government as a third tier of government. Local government in Australia (i.e. local councils) are simply statutory corporations of the state and are not an autonomous tier of government (Dollery 1997, LGSA 2006).

#### Reasons for local governance changes

Reasons for changes to local governance in Australia include cost shifting from higher levels of government to local councils and the desire to improve operational efficiency of local governance (Ermini and Fiorillo 2008).

The State of Victoria viewed local government reform as necessary and long overdue. In 1994, the state initiated a compulsory amalgamation, dismissing 215 municipal councils and creating 75 new councils. The key objectives of the state government were to realize savings and reduce council rates (property taxes) by 20 percent (Llewellyn-Smith 1998).

The State of New South Wales initiated a voluntary reform process in 1995. The state established a Local Government Boundary Reform Board in order to "achieve a significant reduction in the number of councils in the state and a significant reduction in the total costs of providing local government services (Llewellyn-Smith 1998). Since the beginning of the reforms in 1995, the number of metropolitan and county councils have been reduced from 118 to 69 through voluntary amalgamation (Llewellyn-Smith 1998).

#### Structure of changes

Local government restructuring in Australia has typically focused overwhelmingly on the administrative dimension of municipal operations. As illustrated above, Australian local government reform has heavily focused on council amalgamations as the main method to increase cost effectiveness of local services (Dollery and Johnson 2005). In recent years, New South Wales, South Australia, Tasmania and Victoria have all undertaken municipal consolidation of differing degrees of intensity. Amalgamation has remained the major instrument of Australian structural local government changes as there is an enduring belief that bigger is better (Dollery and Johnson 2005).

#### Results of the changes

There have been many differing views on the effectiveness of amalgamating local governments. For instance, the amalgamations in New South Wales have generated significant cost efficiencies and savings, which are ultimately passed on to residents. In addition, several service improvements have been identified and structural reform has brought opportunities for a more regional focus on issues (Llewellyn-Smith 1998).

On the other hand, empirical evidence from both Australia and abroad suggests that not only does municipal amalgamation fail to yield any economic benefits, but larger governments are inherently less efficient and thus more expensive (Dollery and

Johnson 2005). Dollery and Johnson (2005) explain that size and efficiency are not synonymous in Australian local governance and that council amalgamation is only one of several different possible models.

## Denmark

### Political status of local governance

Denmark has a tradition of a decentralised public sector where the majority of the welfare tasks are dealt with by the municipalities (Local Government Denmark 2006). Denmark has a two level system in the public sector that is comprised of the Central Government, Local Authorities, and Counties. The current role of Local Authorities is to provide services such as social welfare (day-care and health services) primary education, and infrastructure and public utilities (Local Government Denmark 2006). The current role of counties is to provide hospitals and public health insurance, social service, secondary education, regional planning and development, culture, environment control, and major roads and regional public transport. The central government responsibilities include overall economic policy, foreign policy and defence, judicial systems, and higher education (Denmark Ministry of Interior and Health 2005).

### Goals of the changes

According to Denmark's Ministry of the Interior and Health (2005), the purpose of Denmark's local government reform is to create a strong and forward looking local government and public sector which solves tasks efficiently and is as close to citizens as possible. An additional goal of local government reform is strengthening local democracy (Denmark Ministry of the Interior and Health 2005).

Other goals of the local government reform between 2002 and 2007 are as follows:

1. A simple and efficient public sector
2. Better service with unchanged taxes
3. An improved health system
4. Clear responsibility
5. Improved citizen services and less bureaucracy
6. Improved citizen involvement and improved participatory democracy
7. Better participatory democracy (Denmark Ministry of the Interior and Health 2005)

### Structure of the changes

The local government reform took place over a five year period beginning with an appointment of a Commission on Administrative Structure in October 2002. The Commission recommended that Denmark adopt larger municipal and regional units to ensure professional sustainability, economies of scale, and the entrance to the public sector to be the entrance to city hall (Denmark Ministry of the Interior and Health 2005).

The reform was primarily in the form of voluntary municipal amalgamations. The recommended minimum population of a municipality to be involved in an amalgamation was 30,000. However, municipalities with between 20,000 and 30,000 inhabitants were still accepted. Local authorities with a population of less than 20,000 inhabitants were to either merge into new local authorities or enter into

binding partnerships with neighbouring local authorities (Larsen 2006). The two options for municipalities with less than 20,000 inhabitants involve either cooperation with a large municipality or cooperation with several smaller municipalities.

### Results of the changes

Local governance reform in Denmark resulted in 66 amalgamations (32 municipalities remained unchanged) which reduced the number of municipalities from 271 to 98. Consequently, the average size of a municipality increased from 20,000 to 55,000 inhabitants (Larsen 2006). Counties were abolished and five new regions were created, each led by a Regional Council with 41 members (Larsen 2006).

The reforms combined the Broad Municipality<sup>3</sup> model with the State model<sup>4</sup> of the public sector. The hybrid model of the public sector distributed the responsibilities of the counties between regions, municipalities, and the state. Municipalities were given the majority of welfare state tasks and became the sole entrance to the public sector<sup>5</sup>. In addition, municipalities took over a share of the county revenue from income tax and all the counties' property taxes (Local Government Denmark 2006). The primary responsibilities of the five regions are health care and regional development (Local Government Denmark 2006), while the central government remained involved in national/regional coordination and highly specialized institutions (Local Government Denmark 2006).

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<sup>3</sup> Broad municipality model is a public sector structure where municipal tasks are augmented with state and regional tasks

<sup>4</sup> State model is a public sector structure where all tasks are placed in the municipality or state

<sup>5</sup> The door to city hall became the door to all government/public services

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